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F ~ lED 
MAY 311979 
THE SUP!l.Et1E COURT OF THE STATE OF ,lli.blL_ ______________ .... 
Cl..k. Sup"""• Couri lJ-tof 
PAllL C/IRIST!CNSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, PETITION FOR REHEARING 
-vs-
Defendant-ll.csponJent. C i vi 1 No • 15 57 4 
CO:·lES fJ0\'1 THE plaintiff (hereafter Christensen) pursuant 
to ll.ule 76 (c) (1), URCP, and petitions the court for a 
rehearing. Said petition is based upon the following points: 
l. The majority decision apparently made or found 
"facts" that lvct·e ncitlwr claimed at the trial by the defendant 
(hr.Tcaftct: Abbott), nor found by the District Court, i.e., that 
the $lll,OOOO promissory note was part of the "joint ventur:e." 
2. Christensen's appeal is founded in law and equity, 
and not Jc,err'ly upon the "facts" supposedly found or: infer:red by 
lhc trial court. Thr;rcfore, the majority opinion should not 
holvce <Jiven lhe lr:ial court's conclusion any special deference. 
5. The rnajority opinion en:-ed in inferring facts from 
tl1e r:oncl us ion reached by the trial court. This seems to 
r";[Wcially true since the trial court did not make any finding, 
rJ:>on IVhich sdid r·onclw.;ion could lc•jically or reasonably be 
!;.· ·d. In f;-',ll t (~ r s of _la~.v_,_ the usual deference to the 
; 11,JtJ11Jr·d ]n, o1nd the C:tltlrt ~~hould dc:tr:rrnine the ecr.-or of the 
''· 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4. Since the trial court would not indulge in a finding 
as to whdt the business v<enture between Christensen and Abbott 
was, then it would seem error for the majority opinion to 
sustain the Trial Courts conclusion of law, i.e., that the 
rarties, by entering into the clear written agreement, intended 
to rlischarge Abbott's obligation in and to a promissory note, 
and to do so without even t'Pfcrring to the promissory note. 
Such a conclusion should strain all credibility and the evidence 
is such that reasonable men would not reasonable conclude that 
such was the intent of the parties. 
5. Since n:'asonable men should not find the promissory 
~ote [rom Christensen to Abbott to be part of the joint venture 
or business relationship between the parties, then there was no 
valid consirleration given or claimed by Abbott to secure 
Christensen's alle~cd rcomise to "tear it up", by reason of the 
As:>l<Jnmcnt and A:;sumption agt·ccment. 
6. The majority opinion correctly notes that from and 
after April 28, 1976, Abbott made no demand upon Christensen for 
lhe rclurn of the 200 Black Angus. However, the opinion either 
:~1i:;scd or chose to ignore the ~reater implication of that fact -
i.r>., '.vhy didn't l\blJOtt cle11and his cattle if the note was 
di';c!Jdt<Je>d? If Abbott truly believed that the note was to be 
" to,- e up, " then 1-1 h y u i cl n' t he t h c n ins is t upon the de 1 i very his 
7. The majot·ity opinion ccrr:d by not requiring Abbott, 
.Js the> nne cl.Jiming Accord and Sati:;faction, to prove the same 
l1y a r~r-r :~r.J!Jfl( r·,-Jncr? r)f the cvi(Jcnce. Instead the majority 
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•>pinion apptnr·ntly E"2uirces Christcenscen to disprove there was 
Accord i'lnd Satisfaction bceyond a reasonable doubt. This net 
rcsul t is to place Christensen in a position contrary to all 
pu·vinus po)nounccmcents of this court and to general rules of 
c•v ide nee, r:.tc. 
8. Thee majnri ty opinion fur·ther improperly indulged in 
cnnsLr·uing or implying (acts, by Cincling that the "Assignment 
c~nd Assumption Agrccement" was "not intended" to be "a final and 
complete expression of their bargain" of Abbott and Christensen. 
This conclusion "flies" in the face of the preponderance of the 
evidence. 
9. The opinion of Justice Hall is both an accurate 
reflection of the law and the facts and should be adopted by the 
majority of the court as its opinion. 
10. The economoic disparity and hardships created by the 
c<)ur·t imposed accord and satisfaction is both unconscionable and 
unjllst. 1\s a matter of equity, this court should probably 
r·<'lll<~ncl the <'ntire matter for a new trial with a new judge. 
"i 1 ·-d 
DATED Lhis 31st clay of May, 1979. 
a 
c.~ti~~a:~ 
Attorney for Pla1nt1f --Appella 
P. 0. Box 2 4 6 
Rooosevelt, UT 84066 
CERTI~ICAT~ 0~ MAILING 
h ,, r·" 1, y , -e 1- t i f y that 0 n the 1 l s t clay of May, 1 9 7 9, 
trur> ,,ncJ c 01-uect copy of lhe fGU"Joing Petition for 
to •.: 1 11.,c" D. llunl and .J.,,;,c·s \-1. flc>lr"ss, Attorneys for 
1011 \·la1krcr flank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
l.• .,- i ny 
r' :1<1 . n t ' 
1111. 
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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs- Civil No. 15574 
WELDON S. ABBOTT, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff, (hereafter Christensen) submits the following 
brief in support of his petition for a rehearing. 
POINT I 
PROMISSORY NOTE WAS NEVER PART OF 
JOINT VENT~ 
In paragraph 2 of the majority opinion, this court made the 
erroneous finding that Christensen and Abbott became involved in 
a joint cattle ranching operation "when Abbott purchased 200 
Black Angus cattle from Christensen on March 6, 1974, giving in 
return a non-negotiable note for $111,000.00, payable on demand." 
This finding by the Supreme Court is in error for the following 
reasons: 
A. THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO SUCH FINDING: The Trial Court 
specifically acknowledged that it was not or could not make~ 
-1-
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such finding of fact when it held in its memorandum decision, 
"whatever the business relationship between the parties was it 
was terminated by the agreement of April 28, 1976." 
B. ABBOTT DID NOT~~ NOTE AS PART OF JOINT VENTURE: The 
defendant Abbott never testified or claimed that the promissory 
note was to be part of the joint venture. All Abbott claimed was 
that in exchange for his executing the "Assignment and Assumption 
Agreement on April 26, 1976 that Christensen was to "play no more 
tricks" and to "tear up" the $111,000.00 promissory note. 
C. WHAT THE c101NT VENTURE INCLUDED: The only things that 
were included 1n H" ioint venture of the parties was the Blue 
Mountain property and 2attle. There was no "joint" obligation to 
either purchase the 200 Black Angus or to pay for them. Rather 
there was a simple Bill of Sale by Christensen with a "home-
drawn" note by Abbott, to evide;·,ce l1.bbott' s indebtedness. 
D. MAJORITY OPINION ENLARGES JOINT VENTURE: The finding of 
the majority opinion that the joint venture extended to and 
included the promissory note, enlarges the joint venture beyond 
even the wildest claim of Abbott. 
E. DEFINITION OF JOINT VENTURE AND APPLICABLE LAW: Justice 
J. Thurman defined a "joint venture" in the case of Forbes v. 
~utler, 66 U. 373, 242 P. 950, as follows: 
A joint venture is in the nature of a 
!Jartnership, ordinarily, but not necessarily 
limited to a single transaction. The law of 
partnership applies as far as substantial rights 
are concerned. 33 C.J. 841, et seq. 
Since the Forbes decision, the Utah Supreme court has always 
applied the law of partnership to joint venture matters. (1.;:9~ 
-2-
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':..:__Peter-son, 68 u. 585, 251 P. 374; Bates v. Simpson, 121 u. 165, 
239 P.2d 749; Ear:-dly v. Samnons, 8 Utah 2d 159, 330 P.2d 122). 
Utah has also adopted the Unifor-m Par-tner-ship Act (Title 48-1-1, 
et seq. U.C.A., 1953 as amended), which clear-ly defines and sets 
for-th the r-ights, duties, r-esponsibilities, etc., of a 
par-tner-ship, par-tner-s, etc. In particular- a par-tner-ship is 
defined as "an association of two or- mor-e per-sons to car-r-y on as 
co-owner-s of a business for- pr-ofit." (48-1-3, U.C.A.) In 
Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 104-3, this cour-t defined the 
subtle, but never-theless impor-tant distinction between a joint 
ventur-e and a par-tnership as follows: 
A joint ventur-e, in the str-ict legal sense, 
descr=T"bes a single business ven tur:-e or:-
tr:-ansactlon, -while a par:-tner:-sh1p r-efer-s to a 
continuing business r-elationship or- association 
which extends beyond a single tr-ansaction or-
ventur-e and may include innumer-able tr-ansactions 
or- ventur:-es •••. (at Pg. 1045 emphasis added). 
Thus while par-tner-ship law gover-ns a joint ventur-e, a joint 
ventur-e is mor-e limited in its scope and purposes, in that it is 
a single business ventur-e. 
E. BY DEFINITION ABBOTT'S NOTE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN PART OF 
THE "JOINT VENTU£-£:_: Either- by the definition of the ter-m "joint 
ventur-e", and/or- by applying par-tner-ship law, Abbott's pur-chase 
of the 200 Black Angus fr-om Chr-istensen with the pr-omissor-y note 
could not have been a joint ventur-e activity for- the following 
r-easons: 
1. The pur-chase of the cattle and the note 
was not par-t of a "single tr-ansaction," i.e., 
pur-chase of Blue Mountain r-anch and cattle; 
2. Since 
200 Angus and 
ther-e was no co-ownership of the 
no joint obllgation to pay for the 
-3-
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200 Angus, then therP. could be no joint venture in 
either the ownership or indebtedness for the 
cattle; 
3. While the running of the 200 angus 
"cattle" might have been a part of the joint 
venture, Abbott's obligation to pay for the cattle 
was Abbott's sole obligation, and not ~ part of 
the ~int venture. 
Thus, the winding up of the joint venture or business 
affairs of the parties did not and could not include Abbott's 
obligation to pay the promissory note, and that is why the 
written agreement made no mention of the same. 
F. ABBOTT'S CLAIM REGARDING PROMISSORY NOTE: Abbott 
admitted executll'"' promissory note; and that other than some 
disputed payments, the only other "payment" Abbott claimed on the 
note was by his assuming Christensen's obligation on the Blue 
Mountain Property. Abbott's further testimony was that 
Christensen agreed to "tear up" the note, if Abbott would just 
sign the agreement, but, that Abbott would not sign the agreement 
unless Christensen agreed not to "play any more tricks." This 
self serving testimony of Abbott was admitted by the Trial Court 
over plaintiff's timely objection that to do so violated the 
Parol Evidence Rule. While the trial court is entitled to 
cprtain prerogatives in making its rulings and findings, etc.; 
and while this appeal is a proceeding in both law and equity, the 
fact is, that the "findings" of the trial court should be 
disregarded when "it is clear that the overwhelming preponderance 
of the evidence is contrary" to those "findings." 
Christensen would again suggest that the overwhelming 
preponderence of the evidence is contrary to the findings of the 
-4-
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trial court. In order to believe Abbott's version of the signing 
of the agreement of the parties, the Trial Court must have 
believed the representation of Abbott that Abbott insisted that 
Abbott would only sign if Christensen would not play any more 
"tricks" on Abbott. However, the overwhelming preponderance of 
the evidence is that there had been "no tricks" played by 
Christensen on Abbott at any time up to that date. However, 
there had been several tricks played by Abbott, i.e., no payments 
of any kind on a mutual obligation on the Blue Mountain Property 
for two years; no payment of any kind on the promissory note on 
the cattle for over two years; no contribution on the yearly 
state and BLM Lease payments for two years; and no appreciable 
contribution for costs of the feed, labor, etc., for maintaining 
the joint cattle enterprise. It was Christensen who had need to 
fear more tricks, not Abbott, and it was Christensen who was to 
have two more tricks played, on him by Abbott, plus one more by 
the trial court. Abbott's tricks were: 1.) that Abbott refused 
to pay the promissory note for the 200 Black Angus Cattle; and, 
2. ) then he let Christensen feed, herd, calf and care for his 
200 Angus cattle for another year without paying a cent. 
Christensen did not promise .to play no more tricks, because he 
had never started playing them. Also, Christensen never promised 
to discharge Abbott's note without payment. 
Christensen pleads with this court to see that justice and 
There was no equity is done, as suggested by Justice Hall. 
Accord and Satisfaction reached between the parties, as to the 
note. This Court must remember, that not even Abbott claimed 
-5-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that the note was part of the joint venture. 
G. THE PREPONDERENCE OF THE EVIDENCE, CONDUCT, ETC· , OF 
ABBOTT DENIES ABBOTT'S CLAIMED DISCHARGE OF THE NOTE: The 
overwhelming weight of the evidence, i.e., Abbot's conduct after 
April 28, 1976; a reading of the Assignment and Assumption 
Agreement of April 28, 1976; the testimony of Mr. Draney; etc., 
overwhelming preponderate against Abbott's claim of discharge, 
and thus the court's ultimate conclusion that an Accord and 
Satisfaction was reached on even the promissory note. 
H. NO CONSIDERATION GIVEN FOR SATISFACTION OF NOTE: Since 
the note was outside of the business transaction or agreement of 
the parties, and 'rc., outsicle of the joint venture, in order for 
Abbott to be discharged from such a substaintial obligation to 
Christensen, then Christensen was entitled to receive 
consideration for the same. While that consideration could have 
taken several forms, Abbott claimed that his agreement to do what 
he was already jointly and seperably liable to do, i.e., pay off 
the Blue MounLH'1 property, was sufficient consideration. The 
fact is that Christensen did not escape any claims of the Haslems 
by entering into an agreement with Abbott. He did obtain a claim 
a<Jainst Abbott if Abbott should fail to perform. But, if Abbott 
became insolvent, died, etc., Haslems' still had their original 
note and mortgage signed by Christensen, and Christensen was on 
the hook for the same. Christensen must ask, if Abbott is 
correct, then what new or adequate consicleration did Abbott give 
in exchange for Christensen forgiving Abbott on the $111,000 note 
plus accrued interest? none! And l'iHY? The answer is in the 
-6-
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overwhelming preponderence of the evidence, i.e., there never was 
a discussion between Abbott and Christensen about "tearing up the 
note." 
I. THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS DISCHARGE OF THE NOTE IS 
ERROR, AS MATTER OF LAW: Notwithstanding the usual courtesy or 
deference extended to the Trial Court's Findings, Christensen 
urges as a matter of law, that the majority opinion errs in the 
Findings and Conclusion it reached. As a matter of law this 
court should never allow a separate, written promissory note to 
be terminated or paid, or satisfied, by operation of law, based 
on the obligees self-serving verbal agreement which is strongly 
in dispute. This seems especially so when there is a written 
contemporaneous agreement that is clear, concise, and 
unambigious, which obviously does not contemplate that any other 
agreement is necessary, and it is itself plainly silent as to the 
alleged discharge. 
J. MAJORITY OPINION SUBVERTS THE PURPOSE AND POLICY OF 
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE: The net result of the courts decision is to 
undermine the policy reason and purpose for which our system of 
jurisprudence has both adopti'od and followed the parol evidence 
rule, thereby banning the use of "inadamissible parol evidence, 
submitted for the purpose of varying and adding to the terms of 
the written agreement." See Rainford v. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 252, 
451 P.2d 769, at page 771. In the Rainford case, Justice 
Callister quoted from the earlier case of B.T. Moran, Inc., :!...:.__ 
First Security Corp., 82 Utah 316, 329, 24 P.2d 384, 389 (1933) 
as follows: 
-7-
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* * * The rule is well settled that, where the 
parties have reduced to writing what appears to be 
a complete and certain agreement, it will, in the 
absence of fraud, be conclusively presumed that 
the writing contained the whole of the agreement 
between the parties, that is a complete memor1al 
of such agreement, and that parol evidence of 
contemporaneous conve~tions, representations, or 
statements w1IT not be received for the purpose of 
vary1ng or--addfng to the terms-of the written 
document.- (emphasis added.)---
Although this court has apparently stated its continued 
allegiance to the principle of law set forth in the Moran case, 
by restating the language from that case in State Bank of Lehi v. 
Woolsey, Utah 565 P.2d 413 (1977\, and Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. 
Lentz, 28 Utah 2ci ~f.l, 501 P.2d 266 (1972), it now appears that 
this court will sacrifice that principle in Christensen v. 
Abbott, in order to give deference to a conclusion of the trial 
court, even though that conculsion is apparently founded in 
unacceptable parol evidence. Christensen believes that this 
court should stand firmly by the principle of law that gave rise 
to the Parol Evidence rule, namely, that no person or party 
should be allowed, in the face of a clear and unambigious written 
agreement, and/or against the preponderence of evidence, or in 
the Jbscnce of fraud, to establish or assert that another or an 
additional agreement was intended or agreed to. If the majority 
opinion should remain the final decision in this case, the result 
would seem to be to encourage the practice of deceit, fraud, and 
dishonesty in the name of deference to the trial court's 
prerogrative, with a complete disregard of those principles that 
the parol evidence rule is designed, at least in part, to 
-8-
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prevent. 
J. SUMMARY POINT I: As a matter of law, and in the 
interest of justice and equity, the majority of this court should 
adopt the dissenting opinion of Justice Hall, thereby reversing 
the decision of the Trail Court, and refusing, under the facts of 
the case, to give the Trial Court's Conclusion of Law, any 
special deference, inasmuch as the evidence overwhelmingly 
preponderates against the trial court's ruling. (see Ross v. 
Ross , 59 2 P. 2 d , 6 0 0 ) . 
POINT II 
IT IS ERROR FOR THE SUPREME COURT 
TO "INFER" FACTS, WHEN NONE WAS 
FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT 
Counsel for Christensen recognizes the need for orderly 
procedure and the need to follow legal precedence. However, 
counsel believes and would urge, that far greater than any rule, 
procedure, deference or precedence that has been followed or 
indulged in in the past, is the need to see that justice and 
equity are done. While from case to case this Court may or may 
not give its usual "deference to the Trial Court's prerogative to 
adjudge the credibility of the witnesses," that deference should 
never be used to allow a patent injustice, fraud or an 
inequitable result. Consider the following: 
A. NEED FOR SPECIFIC FINDINGS BY TRIAL COURT: In order for 
any party to intelligently appeal from a Conclusion of Law 
reached by a trial court, there must be a specific Findings of 
Fact to appeal from. This court should not give deference to the 
-9-
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trial court's prerogative to judge credibility of witnesses when 
the trial court does not itself utilize that judgment by making 
Findings of Fact upon which a Conclusion of Law can be based. 
B. SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT INDULGE IN SPECULATION: This 
court has long held that it will not "speculate on matters 
outside the record." ( see Ream v. Fit zen , 5 81 P. 2 d 1 4 5. ) By 
inferring what the Trial Court may have thought or found, 
especially when the same is not even claimed to be a fact by 
Abbott, then at least to that extent, the majoirty opinion does 
"speculate." 
c. THE INFEREtlCE OF AN INCORRECT FACT IS ERROR: For the 
majority opinion to "infer" a fact neither found by the Trial 
Court, nor ~leged by Abbott, which inference is in fact not a 
correct statement of what the agreement contained, is error and 
in derrogation of the expressed pronouncements of this court that 
it will not speculate as to matters not in the record. The 
speculation of the majority opinion serves to compound the 
problem the appellant appeals from, because it leaves the 
appellant in the unenviable position of having to answer to facts 
that never existed besides coping with a sudden reversal in the 
settl0d pronouncements of this court to not engage in 
speculation. 
D. WITHOUT SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT, THERE IS NO POLICY 
REASON TO GIVE SPECIAL DEFERENCE TO TRIAL COURT'S 
PREROGATIVES: The trial court reached a Conclusion of Law, but 
since it did not make any Findings of Fact to review on appeal, 
why is there a need for the Supreme Court to give any special 
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"deference to the Trial Court's prerogative?" Also, why should 
such a prerogative be indulged in favor of the Trial Court, when 
the Trial Court, in exercising its prerogative, allowed testimony 
that clearly violated the parol evidence rule, in that the 
testimony was offered for the express purpose of aborgating or 
modifying the clear and unambigious terms of a written agreement? 
With all due respect to deferences, precedences, procedures and 
rules, Christensen would urge that when there is abuse by the 
trial court of its discretion, by admitting parol evidence, then 
the prerogative of the trial judge is used or serves as a barrier 
to justice. This result defeats the very purpose or reason why 
the principle of deference to the prerogatives of the trial court 
was adopted, namely to serve as a shield so as to assure that 
justice and equity are protected. 
E. SUMMARY OF POINT II: Justice and equity, demand as a 
matter of law, that not withstanding the normal courtesies and 
presumptions in favor of the prerogatives of the Trial Court, 
that the decision of the Trial court should be reversed, there 
being no Facts to justify the Conclusion of Law reached by the 
Trial Court. 
POINT III 
IMPACT OF ABBOTT'S ACTIONS AND EFFECT OF 
EXCLUDING ABBOTT'S TESTIMONY NOT PROPERLY 
CONSIDERED BY THE COURT 
The majority opinion correctly noted that from and after 
April 28, 1976, Abbott macle no demand upon Christensen to deliver 
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the 200 head of Angus cattle. _!i the facts ~ ~ claimed ~ 
Abbott, then surely he would have been demanding the delivery of 
his cattle. 
Consider the following: 
A. ABBOTT'S CONDUCT: Abbott's conduct after April 28, 1976 
undermines his allegation that the promissory note was to be 
"torn up." The fair import of Abbott's silence or inaction, 
sustains Christenesen's allegation, and the overwhelming 
preponderence of the evidence, that there was no discussion 
contemporaneous with executing the agreement, about the 
promissory note. 
B. EFFECT OF CXC r.r:PI"'G l\BBOTT' S TESTIMONY: If the Trial 
Court would have correctly excluded Abbott's testimony, because 
it was offered to vary or add to the terms of a clear and 
unambiguous written instrument, then the only evidence before the 
court, would have been: Abbott's conduct; Christensen's 
testimony; Dennis Dr·aney's testimony; and, the written agreement, 
and that evidence, ~eperately and jointly, is in full harmony 
with each other. Furthermore, with Abbott's parol evidence 
excluded from the record, then there would be nothing to justify 
the harsh conclusion of the Trial Court, and no need to have 
given the trial court's conclusion any special deference. Since 
Christensen timely objected to the parol evidence, Christensen 
would urge that this court should find that the trial court 
abused its prerogative by allowing said testimony, and overrule 
the same as a matter of law. 
c. IMPROPER USE OF PAROL EVIDENCE: Plaintiff has no 
_,')_ 
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quarrel with the use of parol evidence to explain or "show the 
circumstances under which the agreement was made and the purpose 
for which the instrument was executed." (Bullfrog Marina, Inc. 
v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P. 2d 266 [1972].) However, the 
majority opinion ignores the fact that in Christensen ~Abbott, 
the parol evidence offered by Abbott, far exceeded the historical 
exception for allowing parol evidence to be introduced. Abbott's 
testimony was not to explain the circumstances surrounding the 
execution of the agreement, as an agreement, but, as 
justification and or consideration for his non-payment of the 
promissory note! The promissory note was not a part of the jCiint 
venture of the parties. The joint venture had failed, not 
because Christensen had not made his contribution, but because 
Abbott had not. Abbott never denied that from March 1974 to 
April, 1976, that Christensen had contributed nearly $100,000·.00 
above his initial contribution, to the joint venture, while 
Abbott contributed $0. Abbott never denied that Christensen was 
dependant upon Abbott paying him~ the $111,000.00 note in order 
that he, Christensen, could make additional payments on the joint 
venture obligation. Abbott never denied that during the two (2) 
years of the joint venture, that the only payment the joint 
ve~ture made of either principal or interest on the Blue Mountain 
mortgage, was the $20,000 paid ~ Christensen. The fact is, and 
the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence 
supports this position, and reasonable men would not differ with 
the same, but it was Abbott who caused the joint venture to fail. 
True the joint venture mortgage on Blue Mountain was in 
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foreclosure, and, true, both parties were liable, but since 
Christensen had contributed a~ additional $100,000 to the joint 
venture and Abbott contributed $ 0, the question that must be 
asked is, which party was most culpable for the financial 
rlifficulties that the joint venture was then in? Who gained the 
most by his failure to support the venture, and who is still 
being rewarded with a complete discharge from any and all 
obligation to repay his note? The results are neither just nor 
equitable. 
While Abbott and Christensen reached an Accord and 
Satisfaction regarding the joint venture and settled that 
business arrangement G· '~~uting a plain, clear, and unambiguous 
agreement, the fact is that that 1s all that they did. A review 
that reasonable men cannot find sufficient consideration in the 
settlement or agreement for the alleged "tearing up" of that 
promissory note. To find otherwise is unjust, unreasonable, 
unconscionable and unthinkable, and defies all credibility. When 
weighed in the balance, the net result of the majority opinion is 
as follows: 
CHRISTENSEN 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
(To-A-pril 28~-1976) 
ABBOTT 
$340,226.00 $100,445.00 
(See Appellant's Reply Brief, Pg. 19) 
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DISTRIBUTION 
(Net Assets allowed by the trial court) 
CHRISTENSEN ABBOTT 
$69,138.00 $376,594.00 
(See Appellant's Reply Brief, Pg. 12) 
WHERE IS EQUITY ~ THIS KIND OF RESULT? Why should such an 
unfair and disproportionate distribution be upheld by the court 
because of deference to the trial court is error? Where is there 
room for "tearing up" the note in view of the facts? Why would 
either the trial court or the majority opinion allow Abbott to 
profit so disproportionately by reason of his self-serving and 
unsupported parol evidence about what the parties really intended 
when executed the written agreement? Such a 
disproportionate "split" could never have "knowingly" been 
entered into by Christensen, and surely in order to find that he 
did in fact agree to "tear up" the note, then the court must 
find, by a preponderence of the evidence, sufficent facts to 
sustain Abbott's allegation that Christensen intended to do as 
Abbott claimed. The shocking unfairness and gross disparity in 
the disribution the court imposed can only mean that Christensen 
never intended the same. 
IF all matters in dispute between the parties up to April 
28, 1976, were settled along the lines found by the trial court, 
~XCEPT the promissory note, with interest due on the same, then 
we would be faced with a somewhat more just net result, i.e., as 
follows: 
-15-
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CHRISTENSEN ABBOTT 
$ 69,138.00 Court awarded $376,594.00 
+ 111,000.00 + or - Note - 111,000.00 
+ 13,000. DO + or - interest 13,000.00 
193,138.00 Net Value 252,594.00 
While the net result would still not have been even, things 
would have been a lot closer to being fair than what the court's 
opinion allows. Christensen again asserts that the above result 
is what the parties intended, and what the fair import of their 
agreement would have allowed, but for the the trial court's 
a elm iss ion of the improper parol evidence of Abbott. Without 
Abbott's testimony, there would have been nothing in the record 
upon which this cour-t could have given any deference, so as to 
allow such a unj .. :~t, :'arsh, cruel, and economically debacling 
result to Christensen. 
D. ABBOTT'S CLAIM THAT THE DISCHARGE OF NOTE WAS PART OF 
THE OVER ALL AGREEMENT IS NOT SFLIE~'BLE: Without doubt, as the 
trial progressed, it was evident that there was a dispute between 
Christensen and Abbott about whether Christensen ever agreed to 
discharge or "tear up" the note in exchange for signing the 
agreement. However, reasonable men should not find Abbott's 
testimony believable. Christensen testified that the matter of 
the note was never discussed. Abbott claimed that the note was 
discuc;sl'cl, and at the airpor-t before he would sign it. Dennis 
Draney, who prepar-ed the agreement, and who was also at the 
airport and witnessed Abbott sign the agreement, testified that 
there was "no conversation" between Abbott Chr-istensen at the 
airport. l'lhen further examined by !illbott' s c0unsel Draney 
assured Abbott's counsel that if there was such a ,-,mv'"r':i'!t 1on, 
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that he was sure that he would have recalled the same. This 
court, setting as a court of equity and weighing the credibility 
of Abbott's self-serving and unsupported parol evidence should 
consider what reasonable men would have done under the 
circumstances. IF Abbott had truly discussed the matter of 
d i scha rg ing the note at the airport, then a reasonable person 
would have done so with, or in front of, the person handling the 
transaction, in this case with Mr. Draney, before Abbott signed 
the agreement! It is most interesting to note from the record, 
that after Draney testified that Christensen and his son, both of 
whom accompanied Draney to the Roosevelt airp0rt, had not come 
into the airport lounge itself where Abbot was, but had remained 
back by the door, from the time that Draney and Christensen 
entered the airport until after Abbott, who was at the desk or 
counter, had: 1.) reviewed the agreement; 2.) called his 
attorney; and 3. signed the agreement; and that following which 
Draney had left the airport with Christensen and his son, that 
Abbott chose not to refute or contradict the same. The net 
result of Draney's unrefuted testimony is simply that there was 
no time within which Abbott could have had the disputed 
conversation with Christensen. The overhwelming preponderence of 
the ev~~dence ~ against the parol evidence offered ~ ~ to 
vary the £_X_IJress terms ~ the written agreement, and to justify 
E. THE MAJORITY OPINION PERPETUATES THE ERROR OF THE TRIAL 
COlJI"r RY "lNFERING" THE PROMISSORY NOTE TO BE PART OF THE 
---
RUS!tJI:SS APPlltJCE'li~NT: As indicated in discussion above, the 
~17~ 
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promissory note was not and could not be a part of any joint 
venture, or business enterprise between the parties. The 
conclusion reached in the trial court's decision of June 2, 1977 
is: 
No matter what the business arrangement was 
betweenthe parties-prlor to Aprll 28, 1976, on 
that date the parties concluded the business had 
failed, and they therefore, settled between them~ 
d1vis1on of the property and debts •.. (emphasis 
adde~ -----
The Findings of Fact prepared by Abbott's counsel add 
little, if anything, to the trial court's decision. Because of 
their brevity, the same are set forth herein, and are as follows: 
l. That prior to April 28, 1976, 
plainti':'f -"'l the aefendant were engaged 
business 
the 
in a 
2. That on April 28, 1976, the parties 
decided that the business venture had failed. 
3. That on said ~ate the oarties settled and 
agreed between themsel','2S to -a divis~of the 
property and the debts of said business operation. 
(See pgs. 1 and 
Conclusions of Law) 
2 of Findings 
(emphasis added). 
of Fact & 
It is ,3p;-oorcnt from both the initial Decision of the Trial 
Court, and the brief Findings that were entered, that the only 
th~~ the trial court concluded was that the business arrangement 
bet"''''" the parties had failed, and that as a result the parties 
h3d di, ickcl the property and debts _c:! the busines~ Si nee, the 
promissorv note was not a part of the joint venture or business, 
it could not be part of the division of the property or debts of 
the business, and therefore wus specifically excluded [t-om the 
winding up agreement of the parties. 
F. Sm1~1ARY OF POitJT I I I: In li']ht uf thP facts, the law, 
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and the actual conclusions reached by the 
promissory note should not have been included, by inference, 
presumption, or operation of law, as part of the settlement of 
the joint venture between the parties. 
POINT IV 
MAJORITY OPINION ERRED IN FINDING 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION AS TO NOTE 
Neither Abbott's brief nor the Majority opinion addressed 
itself to the issue raised in Point V of Christensen's original 
brief, regarding the standard of proof necessary to establish 
Accord and Satisfaction, to wit: 
A. AS A SUBSTITUTE CONTRACT, ACCORD AND SATISFACTION MUST 
HAVE CLEAR ASSENT OF BOTH PARTIES: There can be little doubt of 
the sincerity of Christensen's testimony that he never intended 
to give up his right to be paid on the promissory note by signing 
the agreement of the parties. The overwhelming weight of the 
evidence, as briefly summarized in subparagraph "D" of Point III 
above, is that there was no discussion at the airport, or when 
the agreement was signed, or at any other time, about Christensen 
discharging Abbott from liability on the promissory note. When 
one weighs in balance the disparity of positions that would 
result from Christensen waiving his right to be paid on the 
promissory note, as indicated in subparagraph "C" of Point III 
above, then reasonable men would surely conclude that Christensen 
could not have consciously assented to the same. The court's 
attention is again drawn to the case of Tates, Inc. v. Little 
Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228, where Chief Justice Crockett 
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stated: 
The authorities dealing with this problem 
uniformily affirm that it must clearly appear that 
the parties so understood and entered into a new 
and substitute contract. To state the matter in 
the traditional contract language: that there was 
a meeting of the minds on such an agreement. 
(Emphasis added, at page 1230.) 
As a matter of justice and equity, this court should find that 
there was no meeting of the minds; that Christensen did not 
unde-rstand that he was entering into a new substitute contract; 
and thus there was no accord and satisfaction. 
B. PARTY ASSERTING ACCORD AND SATISFACTION HAS BURDEN OF 
PROOF: Apparently the majority opinion indirectly addressed 
itself to this issue by indicating that on appeal it should give 
deference to tl r> '-,-;;,_: co,n-t's findings, and not distrub those 
findings unless the overwhelming preponderence of the evidence 
was to the contrary. Christensen respectfully suggests that the 
there was any accord or satisfaction as to the promissory note. 
Except for the sharply disputed and unsupportable testimony of 
Abbott as to an alleged agreement at the airport to have "no more 
tricks" and to "tear up the note", Abbott introduced no other 
evidence 
conduct belies his cla1ms. In the Ta!;es, Inc. case, op.cit., 
Cl1 iet Justice Crockett m;,de it amply clear that the party 
asserting the new agreement had the burden of proving the same. 
Surely that burden must be carried by a preponderence of the 
evidence. If the trial court had properly excluded Abbott's 
testimony, by reason of the parol evidence rule, then there would 
have been no evidence that in 
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event, reasonable men should conclude 
preponderence of the evidence in favor of 
evidence presented by Abbott was in substantial 
such a situation, where a "novation" of the agreement or a 
meeting of the minds is required, then surely the alleged 
novation or meeting of the minds must be established by more than 
the self serving testimony of the one seeking to be discharged, 
especially when that testimony is in substantial conflict. (see 
Silva v. Holme, 109 C.A.2d 461, 241 P.2d 219 and Fairchild v. 
Mathews, 91 Idaho 1, 415 P.2d 43, and other cases cited on pages 
43 and 44 of Christensen's original brief.) 
C. SUMMARY OF POINT IV: The majority opinion erred by not 
requiring Abbott to carry his burden of proving by a 
preponderence of the evidence, the alleged Accord and 
Satisfaction as to the Note. As a established and fundamental 
rule of law, one should not be able to establish a "meeting of 
the minds" or a novation by evidence that is in substantial 
conflict. 
CONCLUSION 
Christensen respectfully submits that the majority opinion's 
preoccupation with giving the usual deference to Findings and 
Conclusions of the the trial court, has perpetuated the error of: 
including the promissory note in the joint venture agreement; 
infc>rring facts that were never claimed; and, misplacing the 
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burden of proof. 
unconsciously to 
Christensen never intended, consciously or 
discharge Abbott's obligation under the 
promissory note, either verbally or by signing the Agreement that 
terminated the joint venture of the parties. Christensen received 
no consideration for allegedly discharging Abbott's obligation on 
the note. Reasonable men should conclude that there was never a 
"meeting of the minds" between Christensen and Abbott for such a 
discharge. The opinion of Justice Hall is a correct statement of 
both the law and the facts, and should be adopted as the opinion 
of the court. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Edward W. Clyde 
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